martedì, settembre 02, 2003

Sto leggendo moltissimi articoli di filosofia in questi giorni, tutti in inglese e ho deciso di stilare una classifica degli autori e delle opere più citate, per capire gli interessi più attuali, le mode culturali del momento.
Naturalmente rispecchia i miei interessi e quindi riguarda più che altro teoria della conoscenza, metafisica e logica.
La classifica, in ordine alfabetico, è per ora provvisoria e man mano che procedo diventa più verosimile.



1. Ayer, A.J. (1934/52), Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover.
2. Bergmann, G., Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong, Madison (WI), University of Wisconsin Press 1967
3. Burge, "Belief de re" in Journal of Philosophy 1977 (339-362)
4. Carnap, R. (1947) Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
5. Chomsky, N. (2000) New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
6. Churchland, Paul (1979). Scientific Realism and Plasticity of Mind, New York: Cambridge University Press
7. Davidson D. (1980), Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
8. Dennett, D.C. (1978) Brainstorms, Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books.
9. Dretske, F. (1981), Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Dretske, F., (1988). Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, Mass: MIT
11. Dummett, M. (1973) Frege: Philosophy of Language, New York: Harper and Row.
12. Dummett, M. (1978), Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth.
13. Fodor, Jerry, (1983), The Modularity of Mind, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts). (Trad. it. La mente modulare, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1988.)
14. Fodor, Jerry, (1987), Psychosemantics, The MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts). (Trad. it. Psicosemantica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1990.)
15. Frege, G. (1884/1980), The Foundations of Arithmetic, 2nd revised ed., London: Blackwell.
16. Frege, G. (1892/1952) “On sense and reference,” in Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.) (1952) Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell.
17. Kripke, S. (1972/1980) Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.
18. Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell.
19. Lewis, D.K. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford.
20. Millikan, R. (1984), Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
21. Nagel, Th., What Is It Like to be a Bat?, «Philosophical Review», 83 (1974), pp. 435-450; poi in Id., Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P. 1979; tr. it. di A. Besussi, Questioni mortali, Milano, il Saggiatore 1986
22. Neander, K. (1995) “Misrepresenting and malfunctioning,” Philosophical Studies, 79, 109-41.
23. Parsons, T. (1980) Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press.
24. Peacocke, C. (1983) Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
25. Peacocke, C. (1992) A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
26. Putnam, H., The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in K. Gunderson, a c. di, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press («Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII»), 1975, pp. 131-193; poi in Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers, II), Cambridge (MA), Cambridge U.P. 1975, pp. 215-271; tr. it. di R. Cordeschi, Il significato di ‘significato’, in H. Putnam, Mente, Linguaggio e Realtà, Milano, Adelphi, 1987, pp. 239-297
27. Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
28. Russel B. (1905), On Denoting, “Mind”, 14, pp. 479–493.
29. Salmon, N. (1986) Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
30. Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
31. Sellars, W. (1956), “Empircism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in M. Scriven, P. Feyerabend, and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnisota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 253-329.
32. Stich, S. (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, the Case Against Belief, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
33. Strawson, P.F., Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London, Routledge Kegan and Paul 1959; tr. it. di E. Bencivenga, Individui. Saggio di metafisica descrittiva, Milano, Feltrinelli
34. WIGGINS D. (2001), Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge University
35. Wittgenstein, L., (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press


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